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FEDERAL HOSPITALIZATION OF INSANE DEFENDANTS
UNDER SECTION 4246 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE*
PRIOR to 1949 the federal government had to release criminal defendants if
they were insane. They could not be tried for a crime. Criminal defendants
are constitutionally incompetent to stand trial if they are unable to comprehend
proceedings against them and aid in their own defense.' Nor could they be
confined in federal hospitals. Power over the general field of insanity resides
exclusively in the states as parens patriae,2 and it was thought that the federal
government was wholly without jurisdiction in the field.3 Whenever possible,
*63 STAT. 687 (1949), 18 U.S.C. § 4246 (1952).
1. Youtsey v. United States, 97 Fed. 937, 943-44 (6th Cir. 1889); United States v.
Chisolm, 149 Fed. 284, 287 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1906) ; Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 2, 24-25
(N.Y. 1847). Nor could persons incompetent to defend be tried at common law. Case of
John Frith, 22 How. St. Tr. 307 (1790); 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24-25; cf.
Criminal Lunatics Act, 1800, 39 & 40 Gao. 3, c. 94, s. 2 .
2. "The State alone, as parens patriae is charged with the duty of caring for the insane
within its borders. . . ." Shapely v. Cohoon, 258 Fed. 752, 755 (D. Mass. 1918) ; accord,
Hammon v. Hill, 228 Fed. 999-1001. (W.D. Pa. 1915) ; United States v. Jackson, 16 F.
Supp. 126, 129 (W.D. Pa. 1936). In England, power over insane persons was vested In the
sovereign as parens patriae. Sporza v. German Savings Bank, 192 N.Y. 8, 14, 84 N.E. 406,
408 (1908) ; Hammon v. Hill, supra. "When this country achieved its independence, the
prerogatives of the crown devolved upon the people of the States." Wheeler v. Smith, 50
U.S. (9 How.) 55, 77-78 (1850) ; Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369, 384 (1854).
Cf. Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890). Powers not granted to the
federal government either expressly or by necessary implication are reserved to the states.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. X; Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
3. In 1857, Congress provided for the hospitalization of incompetents charged with
federal crime. 11 STAT. 158 (1857), 24 U.S.C. § 211 (1952). But in 1881, the Attorney
General announced that he could apply the statute only to the Army and Navy, and citizens
of the District of Columbia. Since it was a state duty to treat insanity, he thought indict-
ment in a federal court was insufficient to render the insane resident of a state a proper
responsibility of the federal government. 17 Ops. Arr'y GEN. 211 (1881). Congress forth-
with amended another act to provide for hospitalization of all incompetents in the custody
of federal officers. 18 STAT. 251 (1874), as amended, 22 STAT. 330 (1882), 24 U.S.C. § 212
(1952). Nevertheless, federal authorities continued to resist assuming custody of incompe-
tent defendants. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF CoMIT'rrE TO
STUDY TREATMENT ACCORDED BY FEDERAL COURTS TO INSANE PERSONS CHAROED WITH
CRIME 9 (1945) (hereinafter cited as REPORT) ; Hearing Before the Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 850, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1948) (hereinafter
cited as Hearing). But see United States v. Torrez, and United States v. Hooks (unre-
ported cases cited in REPORT 9).
The statute discussed supra, 24 U.S.C. § 212 (1952), also provided for hospitalization
of federal convicts who were insane at the expiration of their sentence. But in 1916 the
Attorney General stated that this statute did not authorize detention after expiration of
sentence. 30 Ors. Arr'y GEN. 569, 571 (1916) ; see 35 O's. ATr'Y GEN. 366, 369 (1927).
In 1930, Congress specifically limited detention to the maximum period for which the con-
vict had been sentenced. 46 STAT. 271, 272 (1930), as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241, 4243
(1952) ; but cf. Kuczynski v. United States, 149 F.2d 478, 481 (7th Cir. 1945).
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the incompetents were transferred directly to state asylums.4 But the states,
with inadequate facilities and limited budgets, were often unable or unwilling
to assume additional burdens -- especially when the insane persons were of
unknown domicile.6 Many incompetents were released outright;7 many of
those initially hospitalized were released while still insane.8 Thus, federal
criminal enforcement was hampered by inability to hold insane defendants ex-
pected to recover capacity to stand trial.9 And many dangerously insane
persons indicted for federal crimes were left at large, where they constituted a
threat to themselves and to society.' 0
In 1949 Congress sought to remedy this situation by enacting section 4246
of the Criminal Code." The first sentence of this section authorizes the federal
government to confine incompetent defendants expected to recover capacity to
stand trial.'2 These incompetents may be held until they are tried or until the
4. Letter from James V. Bennett, Director of the Bureau of Prisons, to Judge Calvert
Magruder, Chairman, Committee to Study Treatment Accorded by Federal Courts to
Insane Persons Charged with Crime, June 25, 1945, at p. 2, appended to REPoaR. Cf.
Hearing 5, 7, 14; Pollack, Insanity as a Bar for Prosecution in the Federal Courts, 7
FED. B. J. 55,70 (1945).
5. Hearing 5, 14; Letter from James V. Bennett to Judge Calvert Magruder, June
25, 1945, at p. 3, appended to REPORT; Letter from Winfred Overholser, Superintendent of
Saint Elizabeths Hospital, Vashington, D.C., to the Yale Law Jourial, April 15, 1954,
on file in Yale Law Library, at p. 2.
6. 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1928, 1929 (1949). Cf. R Eoar 9; Letter from
James V. Bennett to Judge Calvert Magruder, June 25, 1945, at p. 3, appended to RErrr.
7. Persons not directly transferred to state hospitals were turned over to local sheriffs
in the state of their domicile, when known, or the state of their indictment or conviction.
Hearing 7; cf. Letter from James V. Bennett to Judge Calvert Magruder, June 25, 1945,
at p. 3, appended to REPORT.
8. Id. at 2-3. Mr. Bennett "suspected" that this situation was aggravated when the
domicile of the incompetent was unknown.
9. At common law it was routine criminal procedure to incarcerate such a prisoner
until he became triable. Case of John Frith, 22 How. St. Tr. 307 (1790) ; 1 HALE, PLLs
OF THE CROwN *35. The states follow this procedure either by authority of common law
or statute. See, e.g., In re McWilliams, 254 Mo. 512, 164 S.V. 22 (1914); Crocker v.
State, 60 Wis. 553, 19 NAV. 435 (1884). In the absence of statutory provision, federal
criminal procedure is determined by the common law. Howard v. United States, 75 Fed.
986, 990-91 (6th Cir. 1896); United States v. Nye, 4 Fed. 888, 890-91 (C.C.S.D. Ohio
1880). Therefore it was arguable that incompetent defendants might be hospitalized by
federal authorities until triable. REPRoT 6; Forthoffer v. Swope, 103 F.2d 707 (9th Cir.
1939). However, this procedure was not followed and, for lack of alternative procedure,
incompetent -defendants were often tried and convicted. Hearing 5; Letter from James V.
Bennett to Judge Calvert 'Magruder, June 25, 1945, at p. 3, appended to RErour.
10. Hearing 5. Judge Magruder discusses this problem by deliberate reference. Id
at 7,8.
11. 63 STAT. 6S6 (1949), 18 U.S.C. § 4246 (1952). See 2 U.S. CODE CMo.G. & AD.
NEws 1928 (1949).
12. The trial court "may commit the accused to the custody of the Attorney General
or his authorized representative, until the accused shall be mentally competent to stand
trial or until the pending charges against him are disposed of according to law." 63 STAT.
687 (1949), 18 U.S.C. § 4246 (1st sentence) (1952). See Hearing 7. Such a commitment
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charges against them are dropped.13 The second sentence of the section permits
the government to hospitalize incompetent defendants unlikely ever to stand
trial. Confinement of these incompetents must be preceded by a judicial deter-
mination that their release will "probably endanger the safety of the officers,
the property, or other interests of the United States," and that suitable state
care is not available.1 4 But the charges need not be continued ;15 commitment
is an end in itself, wholly unrelated to any prospect of eventual prosecution.
Release is mandatory whenever the incompetent ceases to endanger federal
interests or suitable state care becomes available. 1
may be made only after a determination of incompetence under procedures provided in
§ 4244.
Commitment to the custody of the Attorney General is not mandatory under this sec-
tion. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INSANE PERSONS CHARGED WITH CRME (Circular No.
4126, 1950). Moreover the Attorney General may, at his option, transfer an incompetent
already committed under this provision to state authorities Willing to receive him. 63 STAT.
688 (1949), 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (1952).
13. 63 STAT. 687 (1949), 18 U.S.C. § 4246 (1st sentence) (1952).
14. 63 STAT. 687 (1949), 18 U.S.C. §§ 4246 (2d sentence), 4247 (1952).
Section 4247 provides that the court may commit a prisoner whose sentence is about
to expire if it determines that he is "insane or mentally incompetent, and that if released
he will probably endanger the safety of the officers, the property, or other interests of the
United States, and that suitable arrangements for [his] ... custody and care are not other-
wise available." Section 4246 (2d sentence) provides for commitment of insane defendants
without regard to prospective competency to stand trial, if the court determines that "the
conditions specified" in § 4247 exist. See Hearing 7. Convicts insane upon expiration of
sentence are not given separate treatment in this note, but the constitutional discussion set
forth concerning § 4246 (2d sentence) applies as well to them as to incompetent defendants.
The difficulty posed by disposition of federal convicts insane upon expiration of sentence
was one of the significant problems which motivated the enactment of §§ 4247-48. Hearing
7-8. See note 3 supra. But, although 329 convicts were markedly insane at discharge dur-
ing the five years prior to 1944, only one insane convict has been committed upon expiration
of sentence under § 4247. Letter from James V. Bennett to Judge Calvert Magruder,
June 25, 1945, at p. 2, appended to REPORT; Letter from James V. Bennett to the Yale Law
Journal, April 16, 1954, on file in Yale Law Library.
15. Compare § 4248, determining the conditions for release under § 4246 (2d sentence),
with § 4246 (1st sentence), requiring mandatory release when charges are dropped.
The purpose of commitments under § 4246 (2d sentence) is to protect society against
the consequences of state inaction. Hearing 7-8; REPORT 7-9; Letter from Judge Calvert
Magruder to the Yale Law Journal, April 13, 1954, on file in Yale Law Library, at p. 1.
16. 63 STAT. 688 (1949), 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (1952). The incompetent has a statutory
right of habeas corpus to test the continued validity of his commitment. Ibid. Moreover,
his mental condition is evaluated by the psychiatric staff at least every six months. Letter
from Ivan W. Steele, Warden & Chief Medical Officer of the Medical Center for Federal
Prisoners, Springfield, Mo., to the Yale Law Journal, April 15, 1954, on file in Yale Law
Library.
Federal authorities were at first unwilling to transfer incompetents to state institu-
tions unless they were not considered dangerous to United States interests. Id. This was
explained on the ground that to transfer an incompetent would not be in the public interest
unless "there is every reasonable expectation that his opportunities for escaping from
state custody ...will be minimized." Letter from James V. Bennett to the Yale Law
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The new statute alleviates serious problems created by prior federal inability
to retain jurisdiction over insane defendants. However, since the states are
vested with exclusive power over the general field of insanity,'l section 4246
has presented the courts with serious questions of constitutional law and statu-
tory interpretation. One court has found the statute's first sentence uncon-
stitutional;18 others have upheld it, but in so doing have created unresolved
problems of administration.' And the rationale employed to uphold first-
sentence detention casts doubt upon the constitutionality of the long-term pro-
visions of the second sentence; many courts would seem prepared to invalidate
it as an encroachment upon the domain reserved to the states by the tenth
amendment 20 These doubts have not been satisfactorily resolved by the single
case which has arisen under the second sentence, although a satisfactory solu-
tion is available.2 1
Short-term confinement of insane defendants expected to stand trial: Section
4246 (first sentence)
Most courts have upheld the constitutionality of the provision authorizing
the federal government to hospitalize defendants expected to recover com-
petency.2 2 Congress intended confinement under this sentence only in actual
anticipation of trial,2 but it set no limit on the period of detention.24 One court
interpreted this provision to permit permanent confinement, and accordingly
Jourial, March 15, 1955, on file in Yale Law Library. Absent such expectation state
facilities would not be "suitable." However, "the increasing trend is to transfer [an in-
competent] to a state hospital whenever possible." Letter from Ivan IV. Steele to the
Yale Law Journal, Feb. 7, 1955, on file in Yale Law Library.
Since 1949, 276 defendants have been committed under § 4246 (both sentences) : 126
have been returned to court as competent to assist in their own defense; 116 are presently
in federal hospitals; 32 have been transferred to state institutions under § 424S; and two
have died. Letter from James V. Bennett to the Yale Law Jourval, April 16, 1954, on file
in Yale Law Library.
17. See note 2 spra.
18. See text at notes 23-26 infra.
19. See notes 27-40 infra and accompanying text.
20. See notes 41-43 infra and accompanying te.xt
21. See text at notes 44-60 infra. Q,
22. The chronological development of cases considering the validity of § 4246 (Ist
sentence) is as follows: Higgins v. McGrath, 98 F. Supp. 670, 674 (W.D. Mo. 1951)
(constitutional) (dictum) ; Dixon v. Steele, 104 F. Supp. 904 (W.D. Mo. 1952) (uncon-
stitutional) ; Edwards v. Steele, 1.12 F. Supp. 82 (W.D. Mfo. 1952) (unconstitutional);
Wells v. Attorney General, 201 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 1953) (constitutional); Kitchens v.
Steele, 112 F. Supp. 383 (W.D. 'Mo. 1953) (same); Higgins v. United States, 205 F2d
650 (9th Cir. 1953) (same) ; Craig v. Steele, 123 F. Supp. 153 (W.D. Mo. 1954) (same);
Wright v. Steele, 125 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Mo. 1954) (same).
23. 63 STAT. 687 (1949), 18 U.S.C. § 4246 (1st sentence) (1952). See note 12 mspra.
If this were not true the additional safeguards provided in §§ 4246 (2d sentence), 4247,
and 4248 would have been meaningless. See notes 14, 15 supra.
24. 63 STAT. 687 (1949), 18 U.S.C. § 4246 (1st sentence) (1952). See note 12 supra.
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held the statute unconstitutional. 25  Given the court's interpretation, the
decision seems sound; holding a defendant for a prolonged period ceases
to bear practical relation to future prosecution and becomes detention be-
cause of insanity.26 Other courts, however, have avoided the constitutional
problem by interpreting the statute to permit detention only for a period
reasonably related to criminal prosecution. 27 This interpretation validates the
section as an exercise of criminal power ancillary to prosecution 28 and at the
same time aligns it more closely with the actual intent of Congress. 2
The courts have attempted to create a workable formula by which to define
the period of commitment reasonably related to eventual prosecution. A rela-
tively short period is necessary. Experience suggests that, generally, incom-
petents who do not regain capacity within one or two years will regain capacity
-if at all-only after many years.30 In Wells v. Attorney GeneralV'1 the tenth
25. Dixon v. Steele, 104 F. Supp. 904, 908 (W.D. Mo. 1952) (petitioner permanently
insane) ; Edwards v. Steele, 112 F. Supp. 383 (W.D. Mo. 1952) (duration of petitioner's
insanity undetermined). Both cases were decided by Judge Duncan.
26. Hearing 7; Letter from Judge Calvert Magruder to the Yale Lao Journal, April
13, 1954, on file in Yale Law Library.
So long as a defendant is not permanently insane, his detention may be rationalized as
necessary to insure eventual trial. But at some point during prolonged detention, the desire
to protect society from a dangerous psychotic supersedes the desire to prosecute. See text
at note 30 infra. But see Note, 6 VAND. L. Riw. 928 (1953) (failing to make this distinc-
tion). After what period of detention this point is reached will depend upon the particular
circumstances of each case - including, perhaps, the nature of the incompetent's alleged
crime. See Wright v. Steele, 125 F. Supp. 1, 3-4 (W.D. Mo. 1954). But practical con-
siderations require that this point be determined by objective criteria. See text at notes
33-40 infra.
27. Wells v. Attorney General, 201 F.2d 556, 560 (10th Cir. 1953) ; Higgins v. United
States, 205 F.2d 650, 653 (9th Cir. 1953); Wright v. Steele, 125 F. Supp. 1, 4 (W.D. Mo.
1954) ; Higgins v. McGrath, 98 F. Supp. 670, 674 (W.D. Mo. 1951) (dictum). Bit see
Craig v. Steele, 123 F. Supp. 153, 156 (W.D. Mo. 1954) (permitting detention until
petitioner shows he is permanently insane) ; Kitchens v. Steele, 112 F. Supp. 383 (W.D.
Mo. 1953) (same by implication). The courts above have limited detention to a "reason-
able" period, by which they have meant one reasonably related to detention for prosecu-
tion. See text at notes 30-40 infra. The Craig and Kitchens cases, supra, seem unsound
in this respect. See text at note 26 supra.
28. Higgins v. McGrath, 98 F. Supp. 670, 674 (W.D. Mo. 1951) ; see also Wells v.
Attorney General, 201 F.2d 556, 559 (10th Cir. 1953) ; Higgins v. United States, 205 F.2d
650, 653 (9th Cir. 1953).
29. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
30. Letter from Ronald H. Kettle, Superintendent of Norwich State Hospital, Con-
necticut, to the Yale Law Journal, April 9, 1955, on file in Yale Law Library; Letter from
Edgar C. Yerbury, Superintendent of Connecticut State Hospital (Middletown), to the
Yale Law Journal, April 13, 1955, on file in Yale Law Library; Letter from William F.
Green, Superintendent of Fairfield State Hospital, Connecticut, to the Yale Law Journal,
April 7, 1955, on file in Yale Law Library. See Letter from Winfred Overholser to the
Yale Law Journal, April 8, 1955, on file in Yale Law Library. Definitive statistics are not
available; the conclusions advanced are based upon the experience and opinions of the
above cited authorities.
31. 201 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 1953).
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circuit decided that only a "temporarily" insane person might be held.3 This
formula is unworkable. The court must determine before commitment whether
an accused will recover: but recovery is scientifically unpredictable3 Further-
more, a finding that insanity is "temporary" is not a guarantee of short com-
mitment; it is simply a prediction that the incompetent may some day re-
cover.34 The ninth circuit sought to avoid the latter difficulty in Higgins v.
United States8 5 by requiring a further determination that defendant would
regain competency in a "reasonable" time. 0 This test is even more unwork-
able: it requires a prior determination of both whether and when recovery will
occur. Finally, the district court in Wright v. StcclC 3 7 held that a year and a
half constituted a "reasonable" time as a matter of law.33 Since the accused
remained incompetent at the end of this period, discharge was mandatory. 0
The objective standard established in Wright points the way to a more work-
able formula. At commitment the court should determine a relatively short
period that, as a matter of law, is "reasonably" related to prosecution. A de-
fendant still incompetent to stand trial at expiration of the prescribed period
should be released.40
32. Id. at 560. Wells had been found mentally incompetent, but there had been no
finding as to whether his incompetency was temporary or permanent. Id. at 558. The
court remanded for determination of this question. Id. at 560-61.
33. It is impossible to determine whether insanity is incurable, i.e., "permanent." "As
a psychiatrist I do not know what permanent insanity is.... The [Wells] decision, to
my mind therefore, is highly impractical. . . "' Letter from Winfred Overholser to the
Yale Law Journal, April 15, 1954, on file in Yale Law Library. "The matter of permanent
or temporary insanity is ordinarily not inquired into [by psychiatrists] except when re-
quested by the court.... [A psychiatrist] is at best able to only speculate in the matter
following a course of adequate treatment for the mental illness. Our Chief Psychiatric
Service has on several occasions requested the court to define temporary and permanent
insanity, and they appear to be unwilling or unable to provide such a definition." Letter
from Ivan V. Steele to the Yale Law Journal, April 15, 1954, on file in Yale Law Library.
Dr. Overholser and Dr. Steele are directors of the two federal hospitals in which incom-
petents are confined under 63 STAT. 686-87 (1949), 18 U.S.C. §§ 4246-47 (1952).
34. Insanity is considered "temporary" if it is not incurable-or, as the Vells court
said, "hopelessly permanent." Wells v. Attorney General, 201 F.2d 556, 560 (10th Cir.
1953).
35. 205 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1.953).
36. Id. at 653. See note 27 supra.
37. 125 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
38. Id. at 4. Petitioner had been hospitalized for over a year and one-half, but there
had been no finding as to whether he was temporarily or permanently incompetent Id.
at 3. The court stated that, although a reasonable time "will be dependent upon the par-
ticular circumstances of each case, it seems to me, as a matter of law, that one and one-
half years is, at least, a 'reasonable time' within which to determine the competency of
this accused...." Id. at 4.
39. The court thought it followed from the Wells and Higgins cases that "if petitioner
is not, within a reasonable time after his commitment under Section 4246, Title 13 U.S.C.,
found mentally competent to stand trial upon the charges against him, he must be dis-
charged." Id. at 3.
40. By establishing a short but definitive time period at the termination of which
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Long-term confinement of dangerous incompetents: Section 4246 (second
sentence)
The rationale of most cases permitting short-term detention has cast doubt
upon the constitutionality of the broader provision of section 4246 permitting
long-term detention of incompetents whose release would endanger federal in-
terests.41 The courts have limited or invalidated pre-trial detention under the
narrow provision in order to keep the federal government out of the general
field of lunacy.42 These courts would seem prepared to strike down the broader
provision for the same reason, and without further analysis.43 Other courts
have managed to rationalize long-term detention as an adjunct to the criminal
power,44 but have left important questions unanswered.
In Greenwood v. United States 4r the eighth circuit upheld the confinement
hospitalization must end the courts would (1) eliminate constitutional difficulties, (2)
avoid speculative predictions, (3) eliminate needless litigation by incompetents seeking
to discover whether a "reasonable" period had elapsed, and (4) facilitate hospital adminis-
tration by permitting treatment to be planned over a known period of time. Query whether
a uniform period, fixed without regard for the nature of the illness or the type of crime
charged, would be preferable to a period established from case to case within the sound
discretion of the court.
The period need only be a maximum. The patient should be released as soon as it
appears that he will not recover for many years. However, if it appears thal release would
probably endanger United States interests, the cause should be remanded for adjudication
of this issue before the incompetent is released from federal custody. See note 14 supra.
41. See text at notes 12-15 supra, comparing 18 U.S.C. § 4246 (1st sentence) (1952)
with §§ 4246 (2d sentence), 4247 (1952). See note 42 in ra.
42. See notes 25-27 supra and accompanying text. But see Craig v. Steele, 123 F. Supp.
153 (W.D. Mo. 1954) and Kitchens v. Steele, 112 F. Supp. 383 (W.D. Mo. 1954), reject-
ing permanent detention under § 4246 (1st sentence) not because it was beyond federal
power but because it was not contemplated by the statute.
43. In Dixon v. Steele, 104 F. Supp. 904, 908 (W.D. Mo. 1952), the court stated
that "it is difficult for me to conceive of Federal constitutional authority to invade the
rights of the states in the confinement of its citizens on ground of insanity." And
in Wells v. Attorney General, 201 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 1953), the court felt that § 4246
would not be constitutional if it applied to the permanently insane. Id. at 560. Its decision
was limited to the first sentence of the section, but apparently the court felt that it would
apply with equal force to the second sentence - unless the court did not recognize that the
second sentence referred to an entirely different problem. Id. at 559. The court seemed
unaware that the second sentence of § 4246 incorporates the dangerous-to-federal-interests
test of § 4247 by reference. Dixon v. Steele, 104 F. Supp. 904 (W.D. Mo. 1952) (passiot).
See text at notes 11-16 supra.
44. Greenwood v. United States, 219 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1955) ; Craig v. Steele, 123
F. Supp. 153, 155 (W.D. Mo. 1954) (dictum by Judge Ridge); Kitchens v. Steele, 112
F. Supp. 383, 387 (W.D. Mo. 1954) (same). Judge Ridge stated in Craig and KCitchlns
that such confinement was a proper means of federal self-protection against dangerous
incompetents, pursuant to the government's power to enact a criminal code. "For Congress
to do so provides not to commit a citizen for insanity ... but to -protect the sovereignty of
the United States from law violators." Craig v. Steele, supra at 154. The question is, of
course, to what violation is commitment pursuant?
45. 219 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1955), affirming 125 F. Supp. 777 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
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of a potentially dangerous incompetent pursuant to federal criminal power."
Greenwood was indicted for robbing a post-office, but was incompetent to stand
trial. 7 It was adjudged that he was dangerous to federal interests and that
state care was not available, so that the statutory prerequisites of long-term
detention were present 4s The court stated that the purpose of section 4246
(second sentence) was to protect government and society by isolating just
such an "insane and potentially dangerous offender," and upheld the statute
"incident to" the criminal power.4 9
The court did not make clear, however, what offense the "offender" had
committed, nor what crime brought a "criminal" power into operation. The
statute did not make dangerous insanity a present crime.m° Nor could it have
made the likelihood that the incompetent might thereafter break a federal law
the basis for present confinement under criminal power.r1 The criminal power
cannot, by definition, uphold confinement of an incompetent who has not been
convicted of a criminal act and who, by the terms of the statute, is not being
held in anticipation of a criminal trial. r2
46. Id. at 386-87.
47. Id. at 378, 380. The court noted that Greenwood had a "penchant for robbing post
offices and otherwise violating the law" Id. at 387.
48. Id. at 38D. See 63 STAT. 687 (1949), 18 U.S.C. §§ 4246 (2d sentence), 4247 (1952).
49. Greenwood v. United States, 219 F.2d 376, 3S7 (Sth Cir. 1955). The court con-
sidered the statute as "devising in the interest of federal law enforcement some practical
and legal method of dealing with prisoners, in lawful custody, charged with or convicted
of federal crimes ... who would be a menace to society if released." Id. at 386. See notes
14-16 supra. See also Kitchens v. Steele, 112 F. Supp. 3,3, 387 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
50. The statute is procedural, not substantive. "There is no right of trial by jury on
the question of commitment for insanity. Insanity is not a crime. You are not being held
on the theory that you have been convicted of a crime." Judge Magruder in Hearing 9.
An attempt to make such insanity a present crime would raise serious constitutional
questions. Propensity to endanger federal interests is a product of insanity, and the crime
would be based upon an involuntary condition rather than a willful act. This would seem
to conflict with the underlying philosophy of Anglo-American criminal law.
51. "The law acts in retrospect only, never prospectively. It deals only with people
who have committed crime; not with those who are likely to commit crime." VAirT,
CRMNAL LAW IN ACTION 12 (1934). See Stoutenburgh v. Frazier, 16 App. D.C. 229
(D.C. Cir. 1900). Cf. Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 101 F2d 774,
781-82 (3d Cir. 1939) ; Greene v. Briggs, 10 Fed. Cas. 1135, No. 5,764, at 1140 (C.C.DR.I.
1852).
52. Confinement under § 4246 (2d sentence) is not based upon eventual prosecution.
See text at notes 15-16, 49 supra. Since Greenwood is incompetent he cannot be convicted
of having committed a crime. See note 2 stpra. Therefore confinement is not punishment
for a crime he has committed. But confinement under the criminal power must be either
pending trial or as punishment for a criminal act. Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch.)
448 (1806); Stoutenburgh v. Frazier, 16 App. D.C. 229 (D.C. Cir. 1900). ". . . [A]n
offense which may be the subject of criminal procedure is an act committed or omitted in
'violation of a public law, either forbidding or commanding it." United States v. Eaton,
144 U.S. 677, 687 (1892) ; accord, Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 241 (1942).
Judge Huxman, dissenting in Vrells v. Attorney General, 201 F.2d 556, 561 (10th Cir.
1953), advanced another argument attempting to sustain detention under the criminal
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Greenwood reaches a correct result for the wrong reasons. The statute
should have been sustained as a exercise of civil rather than criminal power.
Insanity proceedings are civil, not criminal, in nature. 3 The federal govern-
ment is not the parens patriae, and ordinarily it does not have jurisdiction to
commit state citizens for insanity. 4 The statute gives it jurisdiction to com-
mit only persons whose insanity endangers federal officers, property and in-
terests.55 The exercise of power is valid not because the federal government
has the powers of a parens patriae, but because under the Constitution the
federal government may take whatever steps are "necessary and proper" to
protect itself.56 As a sovereign, it has the inherent constitutional power to pro-
power. He stated that arrest and indictment brought the incompetent within federal juris-
diction, and "it then becomes its duty to adequately care and provide for" the incompetent.
Ibid. (Emphasis added.) Express constitutional authority is unnecessary. Id. at 563. In
several of its special relationships with citizens, such as servicemen, the federal govern-
ment does have a duty to care for them if they become insane. See 12 STAT. 23 (1860),
14 STAT. 93, 94 (1866), 24 U.S.C. § 191 (1952). Here federal authority is upheld as a
"necessary and proper" incident of maintaining armed forces. But it is not a "necessary
and proper" incident of criminal power that the government be allowed to care for insane
persons who are not awaiting trial or being punished.
Nor does the federal government bear the same relation to a prisoner charged with
federal crime as it does to a resident of a federal district or territory. Over them it may
exercise all powers normally reserved to the states. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 17; U.S.
CoNsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. True, when an insane person has no ascertainable domicile and
no state will accept responsibility for his care, his only operative citizenship is federal.
Arguably, the federal government should treat him as it would an insane resident of a dis-
trict or territory. But this argument is inconsistent with the theory of the Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77-78 (1872) (specifying the privileges and immunil-
ties of United States citizenship).
53. Hook v. Simes, 98 N.H. 280, 282, 98 A.2d 165, 167 (1953) ; Hirst v. Cramer, 195
S.W.2d 738, 741 (Mo. 1946) ; People ex rel. Edwards v. Superintendent of Bellevue, 235
N.Y. 398, 401, 139 N.E. 553, 554 (1923).
Apart from concern for the welfare of the incompetent, the factors motivating commit-
ment under the federal statute are identical with the purposes of a state in permitting his
civil commitment. See SmooT, INSANITY §§ 136-38 (1929).
Commitments under § 4246 (2d sentence) and § 4247 were intended to be founded pure-
ly on grounds of dangerous insanity formally adjudicated under § 4244. See Hearing 7,
8, 9. See note 50 supra.
54. See notes 2, 3 supra. An old statute, 18 STAT. 251 (1874), as amended, 22 STAT.
330 (1882), 24 U.S.C. § 212 (1952), authorized federal confinement of insane persons
charged with federal crimes purely as a public health measure. This section was rarely
used because it was thought to endow the federal government with parens pairiae powers.
55. 63 STAT. 686 (1949), 18 U.S.C. §§ 4246 (2d sentence), 4247 (1952). The statute's
limitation to this narrow class of incompetents distinguishes it from the older statute, see
note 54 supra, and was added with the constitutional question in mind. Letter from Judge
Calvert Magruder to the Yale Law Journal, April 13, 1954, on file in Yale Law Library.
Cf. Hearing 7, 8 (by inference).
56. "Congress, undoubtedly, possesses that power [of self-protection], as it possesses
every other power essential to preserve the departments and institutions of the general
government from impairment or destruction, whether threatened by force or by corruption."
Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934) ; accord, United States v. Metzdorf,
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tect itself, its officers, property and interests.5 7 When those interests are en-
dangered by insane persons, it is necessary for the federal government to be
certain that those persons are confined.55 If the states will not confine them
the federal government may do so itself, provided that it observes the limits
of due process of law%. And the proper way to confine insane persons is by
civil commitment for insanity.c They cannot be committed criminally because
they have not committed criminal acts.
As Greenwood recognized, the dangerously insane person may jeopardize
federal interests to the same extent as the criminal. 01 In order to effectuate
the policy of the statute, a liberal interpretation of what endangers federal in-
terests is desirable. Persons indicted for violating federal laws and released
while still insane are likely to endanger the interests those laws were enacted
252 Fed. 933, 935-36 (D. Mont. 1918); ef. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 501
(1951).
The criminal power itself is an "implied" rather than "enumerated" power. Except with
regard to a few specified types of crime, such as treason, the federal criminal power exists
because it is "necessary and proper" to protect the federal government and its institutions
and interests. United States v. Fox, 95 U.S. 670, 672 (1878) ; United States v. Hall, 93
U.S. 343, 357 (1879). See BRzwsmR, FEDE AL PRocEnuRE § 934 (1940).
57. Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934) ; United States v. Metzdorf,
252 Fed. 933, 935-36 (D. Mont. 1918); cf. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 501
(1951).
58. See Hearing 7, 8; Letter from Judge Calvert Magrder to the Yale Law Journal,
April 13, 1954, on file in Yale Law Library, at 2.
59. "Certainly, if no state will assume responsibility for locking up such an insane
person, the federal government must have incidental power, in the protection of its officers,
to detain such a person in an insane hospital to keep him out of harm's way. Of course
such a person could not be committed to an indefinite federal commitment of that sort
without affording him due process of law. .. ." Ibid.
The courts' fears that federal action in this area would encroach upon rights reserved
to the states by the tenth amendment, see note 42 supra, raises a false issue. The statute
explicitly provides that federal commitment must terminate when the states become will-
ing and able to provide suitable care. See note 16 supra. It would not be "necessary and
proper" for the federal government to protect itself against dangerous incompetents if the
states were willing and able to provide for them. The danger to federal interests arose
because the states did not do so; it was aggravated because of the large number of in-
competents who had no ascertainable domicile. See notes 5-10 supra.
60. In Greenwood v. United States, 219 F.2d 376, 387 (8th Cir. 1955), the court made
clear that confinement was justified because the incompetent, if released, would be just as
dangerous to society as if he were a criminal. But it sustained commitment under the
criminal power even though Greenwood was not a criminal. See text at notes 50-52 supra.
The court in Kitchens v. Steele, 112 F. Supp. 383 (W.D. Mo. 1953), stated that confine-
ment under § 4246 (2d sentence) was not "punishment of insane citizens solely fur viu-
lation of a criminal law... but is, in effect, investing federal courts with chancery juris-
diction... ." Id. at 387 (dictum). Yet, it too would have upheld the second sentence under
the criminal power. If these courts had recognized that commitment is civil in nature, see
note 53 supra, the constitutional doubts as to what crime brought the criminal power into
action would never have arisen.
61. Greenwood v. United States, 219 F.2d 376, 387 (8th Cir. 1955).
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to protect.62 Therefore, indictment for a federal crime should constitute a
prima facie case that the incompetent's release would probably endanger
federal interests.03 And once that danger to its interests is established, the
federal government may properly protect itself by civil commitment.
62. A person can be indicted for feloniously violating a federal law only if a grand
jury is convinced there is probable cause t9 believe he is guilty. See Beavers v. Henkel,
194 U.S. 73, 84 (1904); United States v. Smythe, 104 F. Supp. 283, 300 (N.D. Calif.
1952); In re Cravens, 40 F.2d 931, 932 (W.D. Mo. 1929). See also AmERICAN LAW IN-
SrITUTE, CODE OF CRrmINAL PROCEDURE § 140 (1931). If he is released while he is still in-
sane, it is likely that he will again commit acts which are forbidden by federal law even
though, because of his insanity, they are not "criminal." Greenwood, with his "penchant"
for robbing post offices, is "typical." Greenwood v. United States, 219 F.2d 376, 386, 387
(8th Cir. 1955). Release would not only jeopardize the federal interests which the laws
were enacted to protect; it would also jeopardize the federal interest in enforcing its laws.
"Insanity which will enable a law violator to escape conviction is not a license to violate
the law.. ." Id. at 387.
63. The evidentiary value of indictments may vary. The type of act charged, con-
sidered with the nature of the illness, may fail to indicate that repetition is likely. Flow-
ever, in the light of the policy behind the statute, the burden of showing lack of danger
should fall upon the indicted psychotic.
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